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IMPASSE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
DAVID G. EPSTEIN

The word "impasse" is an important part of the working vocabulary of all
practitioners and students of labor relations. Although numerous trial examiner
reports, board orders, court decisions and commentators have used the term
impasse, the concept has never been discussed at length.1 In NLRB v. TexTan, Inc.,2 the Fifth Circuit described "impasse" as "a state of facts in which
the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked."3 The Tex-Tan
definition, while accurate, is of limited practical significance. It adds little to
the definition of impasse that might be found in almost any standard desk
dictionary.4 The only difference, one of major importance, is that an impasse
in bargaining, unlike an impasse in any other situation, requires the "best of
faith." 5 Unless the deadlock in negotiations has been reached in good faith, the
legal ramifications of an impasse are not applicable. 6 Yet the Tex-Tan definition leaves a number of important questions unanswered. This Comment explores two of these questions : the significance of the finding of an impasse, and
more important, the factors considered in determining whether an impasse
exists.
I.

SIGNIFICANCE OF .AN IMPASSE

In most situations, a union is affected only indirectly by the presence of
an impasse. Thus, a union does not have to wait until an impasse has been
reached before it may strike. On the other hand, the scope of action of an
employer is affected by the existence of an impasse in three major respects.

A. Defense to a Refusal To Bargain Charge
The term "impasse" was first used to characterize a labor dispute in
Lengel-Fencil.1 There the employer and the union, although they met on numerous occasions and made both proposals and concessions, were unable to
1 A number of legal writings briefly discuss some aspect of the impasse doctrine.
See, e.g., Bowman, An Employe~s Unilateral Action-An Unfair Practice?, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 487, 500 (1956); Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 251, 255
(1953).
2 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
8Jd. at 482.
4 Webster defines impasse as a "predicament affording no obvious escape ••• deadlock." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 418 (7th ed. 1963).
5 See NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130, 136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 827 (1949).
6 An examination of Board decisions in which the claim of impasse has been rejected clearly reveals that the most common reason for rejection is the failure of the
parties to bargain in good faith.
18 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938).
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agree about wages. After bargaining collectively for over a month and a half,
the employer conducted a vote by mail to determine whether the workers would
be willing to return at the pre-strike wage scale. The union claimed that this
constituted an unfair labor practice, a refusal to bargain. The Board, however,
held that the employer's action should not be isolated from its context. Here,
at the time the straw vote was taken, a definite impasse in the negotiations had
been reached. Having bargained to an impasse, the parties were not legally
obligated to meet ~nd bargain further. This is now an established concept in
labor law. Without exception, the courts have recognized an impasse as a
defense to a charge of refusal to bargain.8
Although the Labor Management Relations Act makes no mention of
impasse, statutory justification for this defense can be found. While the duty
to bargain was established by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,9 the
term "bargaining" was not statutorily defined until the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Section S(d),10 which defines bargaining, provides that
it does not include the obligation to agree to a proposal or make concessions.
Since neither party is required to yield, stalemates can and do result. Therefore
the language of the statute compels recognition of a concept such as impasse
as a defense to a refusal to bargain charge.
This defense, however, is subject to several limitations inherent in the
impasse concept. An impasse in bargaining is a temporary state of affairs ;11
when the situation changes, the duty to bargain is revived. The Board will use
almost any occurrence indicating that further negotiations will be fruitful to
signify an end to the impasse.12 It is well settled that a strike effects a change
of circumstances sufficient to break an impasse.13 Its economic impact may
cause one of the parties to yield from a previous bargaining position. Moreover,
a strike often introduces new issues, such as replacement of the strikers, which
must be bargained about. Other, less conspicuous changes, such as improves See, e.g.,-NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); Shell
Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
9 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
10 For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment • . . but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession. • • .
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29
u.s.c. § 158(d) (1964).
11 See Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 666, 674 (1962).
12 Taplitz, Refusal to Bargain, N.Y.U. 7TH ANNUAL CoNF. ON LABOR 171, 229 (1954).
lSE.g., NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert.
cleniecl, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); American Laundry Mach. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 981 (1948),
enforced, 174 F2d 124 (6th Cir. 1949).
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ment in the employer's business,14 alteration of a bargaining position,15 and
even a mere passage of time,16 have also been found to break an impasse.
A second liPlitation is that a party cannot bargain to an impasse over
nonstatutory terms; if the deadlock does not involve "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment," then there is no impasse. This principle
first appeared in a series of Board decisions holding that an employer violated
section 8(a) (5) by insisting upon nonstatutory subjects of bargaining.17
Appellate review of the first two of these eases lclt the status of this principle
in doubt.18 In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 19 enforcement of the Board order was
denied on the ground that the subject was statutory; in Darlington Veneer
Co.,20 the order was enforced but the court did not rely on the ground that
nonstatutory subjects cannot be bargained to an impasse. Appellate review of
the third Board decision, however, removed any doubt as to the propriety of
the Board's use of this doctrine. In Borg-Warner, 21 the company submitted
counterproposals calling for a ballot clause22 and a recognition clause.23 From
the outset, the union made clear that these provisions were wholly unacceptable
to it, and when the employer refused to omit them, the union filed unfair labor
practice charges. The Court held that the bargaining parties may not "lawfully
insist upon ... [nonstatutory subjects of bargaining] as a condition to any
agreement." 24
The theory underlying the Borg-Warner decision is sound; there should
be some subjects of bargaining that cannot lawfully be insisted upon as a condition to an agreement.25 For example, an employer should not be permitted
Kit Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1962).
15 Baker Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.RB. 1012 (1948).
16 Jeffrey De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F.2d 134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 731 ( 1937).
17 See Co=ent, 71 HARv. L. REv. 502, 510 (1958).
18 Ibid.
19106 N.L.R.B. 939 (1953), enforcement denied, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
20113 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1955), enforced, 236 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956). The court
apparently reasoned that the employer's proposal was against the policy of the act. In
addition, there was independent evidence of bad faith on the part of the employer.
21113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955), modified, 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956), 356 U.S. 342
(1958). The Borg-Warner decision has been greatly criticized by legal co=entators.
See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term 1957, 44 VA. L.
REv. 1057, 1074 (1958) ; Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64
CoLUM. L. REv. 248, 273 (1964); Fanning, The Duty to Bargain in 1962, 14 LAB. L.J.
18, 21 (1963) ; Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining,
57 MICH. L. REv. 807, 826 (1959) ; Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith,
47 VA. L. REv. 988, 993 (1961). Contra, Sigal, The Evolving Duty to Bargain, 52 GEO.
LJ. 379 (1964).
22 This clause provided for a pre-strike vote of all employees on the employer's last
offer before the union could call a strike.
23 The recognition clause excluded the certified international union and substituted
the local. This is clearly not a statutory matter.
24 356 U.S. at 349.
25 Even the dissenting opinion in Borg-Warner seems to accept some limitation.
Justice Harlan states: "I do not deny that ••• unyielding insistence on a particular item
H

772

TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44 :769

to insist on bargaining about the method of selecting union officers nor should
a union be allowed to demand a voice in selecting a corporation's board of
directors, since these are matters that are within the prerogative of only one
of the parties. But the holding of Borg-Warner on the factual issue involved is
questionable. Although the recognition clause is clearly not within the statutory language, the court did not properly analyze the ballot clause. This clause
directly affects the employer-employee relationship since it, in effect, determines whether or not a strike will occur by requiring the union to ascertain
the employees' sentiment before it can caII a strike.26 By limiting the union's
right to strike, the ballot clause closely resembles a no-strike clause on which
the parties can bargain to an impasse.27
The literal terminology of section 8(d) should not be determinative of
the matters that can be insisted upon to an impasse. This holding in BorgWarner seriously impairs bargaining on nonstatutory subjects.28 In the first
place, a party can only mention a nonstatutory or permissive matter; if the
other party does not agree to discuss it, then the proponent must drop the
matter. If he insists on it, he may be found to have bargained in bad faith.
Second, this rule is unduly rigid.29 Management and union prerogatives vary
from industry to industry, and a mandatory subject of bargaining in one
industry may be highly inappropriate in another.30 The custom in the industry,
the history of the bargaining between the parties, and technological changes
are among the factors that must be considered in determining whether the employer and the union should be required to bargain on a particular matter.31
These factors may not be considered under Borg-Warner, which subjects
everyone to the same rule. Finally, the one advantage of a rigid rule-certainty
of result-is lacking here since no one knows exactly what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. No comprehensive general rules have been formulated, and the courts' position is in a state of flux.
Since it is unlikely that Borg-Warner wiII be overruled,32 it is neci:ssary
to find some way to limit the detrimental effects that its holding will have on
may be a relevant consideration in the over-all picture in determining 'good faith,' for
the demands of a party might . . . be so extreme as to constitute some evidence of an
unwillingness to bargain." 356 U.S. at 359.
26356 U.S. 342, 353 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
27 See Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.RB. 1306 (1948).
28 See Comment, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1225, 1241 (1959).
29 See Cox, supra note 21, at 1083.
30 Ibid. There are also variations within a particular industry. For example, suppose
a financier with a reputation for acquiring companies and then "milking" them buys a
plant. It would be only reasonable for the union representing the plant's employees to
want some assurance that the new owner will not "milk" the company. Under BorgWarner, however, the union could not insist that the new owner bargain over a clause
requiring adherence to past practices of executive compensation.
31 Ibid.
32 See Duvin, supra note 21, at 273; Fleming, supra note 21, at 1005.

COMMENTS

1966]

773

the collective bargaining process. There are two practical alternatives: first,
liberalize the interpretation of the phrase "other terms and conditions of
employment" to include every proposal that is not contrary to a federal
statute or a declared public policy. This, to some extent, is what is being done
today ;33 second, find that bargaining to an impasse on nonstatutory issues is
not per se a violation of either the employer's or the union's statutory duty to
bargain. The nature of the controverted issue would be a factor, but not a
controlling factor, in finding bad faith.
The second alternative, not presently in use, would not destroy all distinctions between statutory and nonstatutory terms, but would merely return the
classification to its pre-Borg-Warner status. Prior to Borg-Warner, the only
immediate importance of the classification was that, if the subject was statutory, either party could compel discussion.34 On the other hand, whether the
matter would be included in the collective bargaining agreement depended on
the economic power of the parties. Borg-Warner added a second importance:
The classification determines not only which subjects must be discussed, but
also which subjects either party can exclude from the agreement regardless of
bargaining power. If the alternative is adopted, however, the Board will still
require bargaiuing over nonstatutory subjects, but it will not, by automatically
disallowing any impasse, prevent the parties from bargaining over nonstatutory subjects.

B. Unilateral Action
Since one of the purposes of labor-management legislation is the fostering
of collective bargaining, courts have looked with disfavor at wage increases and
other benefits conferred by the employer to the employees without consulting
the union.35 Collective bargaining developed as a means of counteracting the
employers' almost complete control of working conditions. Unilateral action
by employers concerning wages, hours, or working conditions undermines
union prestige36 and tends to discourage membership, since management rather
than the union gets the credit for the benefit to the employees.37 The employer's
duty to bargain, however, is not absolute.38 Except for two major limitations,
33 Recent

cases have significantly expanded the scope of the statutory language of

§ 8(d). See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965);

Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
34 See Cox, .mpra note 21, at 1082.
35 See Bowman, supra note 1.
36 See TELLER, MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1947) ;
Lang, U11ilateral Cha11ges By Ma11age111e11t as a Violatio11 of the Duty to Bargaill
Collectively, 9 Sw. L.J. 276, 280 (1955).
81 CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURES 122 (1944).
38 Originally the Board planned no limitations on its bar of unilateral action. If a
party was under an obligation to bargain about a subject, it could take no unilateral
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the employer has the right to make unilateral changes after an impasse has
been reached in collective bargaining.39 The first limitation is on the extent of
change; when a bargaining impasse has been reached, an employer may institute
changes only to the extent previously offered to the union.40 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills4 1 presents one of the most aggravated cases of improper
unilateral action. While negotiations were at an impasse regarding wages, the
company granted its employees a wage increase that was not only substantially
larger than that previously offered to the union but was also larger than the
wage increase that the union had demanded. The Court held this to be an unfair labor practice. Offering employees more than was offered to the employees'
bargaining agent clearly indicates bad faith. An employer bargaining in good
faith should be as willing to make concessions through collective bargaining as
through his own unilateral action. Furthermore, had the employer offered the
union as much as he unilaterally gave the employees, the impasse might have
been avoided.
The second limitation on an employer's power to act unilaterally is less
definite: the manner in which the employer acts must not disparage the bargaining agent or undermine its prestige.42 This limitation is best illustrated by
Central Metallic Casket Co.,43 where the employer, after bargaining to an
impasse over a bonus plan, unilaterally instituted the plan. Before acting, however, he held individual bargaining conferences with several employees. During
these conferences he refused their requests that the union agent be included in
the discussions and threatened dismissal if they did not state in writing their
support of the plan. The Board held:
The existence of a bargaining impasse does not destroy either the
authority of the representative to act within the sphere of its representation nor the right of the employees to seek by collective action
... to persuade the employer . . . . [A] bargaining impasse does not
relieve an employer from the continuing duty to take no action which
the employees may interpret as a "disparagement of the collective bargaining process" or which amounts in fact to a withdrawal of recognition of the union's representative status or to an undermining of its
authority. 44
action in regard to it. See Humphrey, The Duty to Bargain, 16 Omo ST. L.J. 403 421
(1955).
•
39 This exception was first recognized in NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337
U.S. 217, 225 (1949). For a complete discussion of unilateral action, see Bowman, supra
note 1; Humphrey, Sl!Pra note 38, at 421; Schatzki, The Employer's Unilateral Act-A
Per Se Violation Sometimes, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 470 (1966) ; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 666 ( 1962).
.
40 E.g., Bowman, supra note 1, at 500; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 666, 674 (1962).
41 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
42 See Taplitz, mpra note 12, at 228; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 666, 674 (1962).
4391N.L.R.B.572 (1950).
44 Id. at 573-74.
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In explaining how the employer's unilateral action disparaged the union's
role as a bargaining agent, the Board did not rely on the change but on the
manner in which the change was effected.45 Thus, although the employer is free
to act unilaterally after an impasse has been reached, he is not free to act unilaterally in any manner he chooses. The existence of an impasse does not relieve
an employer of all statutory obligations.46

C. Lockout
Until recently, the impasse concept was utilized only as a defense to a
refusal to bargain charge or as a justification for unilateral action. In American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB,41 the Court greatly expanded the importance of an
impasse when it stated: "[A]n employer violates neither § 8(a) (1) nor
§ 8(a) (3) when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he temporarily
shutS' down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing
economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position."48
Although a number of earlier lockout cases mentioned impasse, it had
never before been argued as a justification for a lockout.49 Neither the advocates nor the critics of the bargaining lockout discuss impasse as a relevant
factor primarily because, in the past, "lockout" cases have involved different
statutory provisions from "impasse" cases. As the excerpt indicates, a lockout
involves questions under sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3), 50 whereas, prior to
45 The Board in its opinion mentioned four factors which established that the employer "sought to subvert the collective bargaining process and to undermine the authority
of the statutory representative .••." All four would clearly be violations of § 8(a) (5)
in any situation. Id. at 574.
46 For example, even if an impasse had been reached, an employer in unilaterally
granting a wage increase cannot say: "If it had not been for the union, you would have
received this long ago. Get rid of the union and your wages will rise." The existence
of an impasse temporarily relieves an employer of his duties arising under § 8(a) (5);
impasse does not, however, affect obligations arising under other sections of the Act.
47 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
48Id. at 318. Section 8(a) (1) prohibits employers from interfering with the rights
guaranteed to employees in § 7, namely the right to engage in concerted activities such
as strikes; § 8(a) (3) prohibits employer discrimination for the purpose of discouraging
unionism.
49 As early as 1943 the Board found an impasse in a ease in which a lockout was
at issue. See Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943). The lockout in Duluth
was sustained on the ground that the employers were reasonable in believing that
they would be struck and that a strike would result in a spoilage of materials. This
type of lockout is generally referred to as an "economic lockout." Existence of an intpasse is in no way determinative of the legality of such a lockout; the essential issue is
whether a sudden unanticipated strike would result in undue hardship to the company.
See, e.g., Duvin, "The Bargaining Lockout: An Impatient Warrior, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 137, 142 (1964); Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old
Terrain, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 614, 616 (1961). Impasse had also been mentioned in
"defensive multi-employer lockouts"-lockouts by members of a multi-employer bargaining unit in response to a whipsaw strike by the union. See Morand Bros. Beverage Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950). Here again the existence of an impasse was not determinative.
50 Six of the circuit courts considered the problem of the bargaining lockout prior
to American Ship Bldg. Although they were in disagreement concerning the validity of
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American Ship Bldg., impasse was relevant only to section 8(a) (5) refusals
to bargain.51
When a lockout is challenged on section 8(a) (1) or section 8(a) (3)
grounds, it would seem that the presence of an impasse should be of no importance. One circuit court has taken this position saying: "While in American
Ship Building there was an impasse in the negotiations between the employer
and the union, we do not think the teaching of that case merely adds another
exception to the Board's category of permissible lockouts."52 American Ship
Bldg. offers no reason to the contrary.53 This does not mean, however, that the
existence of an impasse is of no importance in determining the legality of a
lockout. In a lockout situation, a court should still consider the impasse in light
of section 8(a) (5). In other words, the court should use the impasse as a guide
in determining whether or not the bargaining lockout constituted a refusal to
bargain in good faith.
II.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN FINDING AN IMPASSE

The American Ship Bldg. litigation offers only a limited insight into the
factors courts consider in establishing the existence of an impasse. The trial
examiner, in his Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, found that
an impasse in the bargaining had been reached. He expressly mentioned only
two bases for finding an impasse: ( 1) the parties met and bargained collectively
on twelve separate occasions, and (2) the parties called in the Federal Mediation Service.54 It is obvious, however, that the trial examiner did not limit his
consideration to these factors because he added that "the existence of an
impasse judged with hindsight is as difficult to determine as the reasonableness
such a lockout, they. were uniform in their approach. All examined the lockout in the
light of §§ 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). See Local 374, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB,
331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rw'd sub nom. American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300 (1965); NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Utah
Plumbing & Heating Contractor's Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961);
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917
(1959); Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co.
v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
51 Cf. Aetna Plywood & Veneer Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 329 (1961), enforced sub 11om.
Local 743, Warehousemen & Mail Order Employees v. NLRB, 302 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1962) ; W. W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforced, 174 F.2d 875 (1st
Cir. 1949).
52 Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527, 530 (6th Cir. 1965).
The Board decision in Detroit Newspaper preceded the Court's decision in American
Ship Bldg.
53 The decision merely states that a violation of § 8(a) (3) requires an intention to
discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate against the union, and that a
lockout in support of a legitimate bargaining position is not inconsistent with § 8(a) (1).
54American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1380 (1963).
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of Respondent's belief that a strike would occur.... Impasse cannot be determined by completely objective criteria. Subjective considerations, if held in
good faith e~en if ignorantly, cannot be disregarded." 55
The trial examiner's report was adopted by the Board only to the extent
consistent with its own order. The decision of the Board made no mention of
impasse.56 The Board discussed only whether the lockout was an economic
lockout, one designed to avoid extraordinary losses threatened by an eminent
strike.57 Relying on union assurance that it had no intention of striking, the
Board held that the lockout was not an economic lockout and thus violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). The circuit court opinion, summarily affirming
the Board's decision, sheds no further light on impasse.58 The Supreme Court,
although limiting its holding to a situation where an impasse has occurred,59
does not elaborate on why there was an impasse.
American Ship Bldg.'s failure to enumerate what factors are relevant in
finding an impasse is not unusual. Very often the Board and courts merely find
that negotiations have reached an impasse without giving any reasons to support their conclusion.60 The significance of an impasse, however, makes it
important to know the factors that constitute this bargaining situation. As the
Tex-Tan definition revealed, there are two basic requirements: (1) a deadlock
in negotiations, and (2) good faith bargaining. In most cases where the existence of an impasse has been at issue, the Board had been primarily concerned
with whether the parties had bargained in good faith rather than whether the
parties were truly deadlocked. Similarly, while numerous scholarly works have
considered the problem of what is good faith bargaining,61 little consideration
has been given to what is a deadlock. Therefore this Comment will deal only
with those factors that should be. considered in making the latter determination. 62
55 Ibid. Read literally, this statement has tremendous implications. For example, if
there are no objective criteria for impasse, then Borg-Warner surely could not restrict
impasse to mandatory subjects of bargaining. Also, if subjective criteria are to be considered in determining the existence of an in1passe, it would seem that the parties could
never be certain as to when an impasse had been reached.
56 142 N.L.R.B. at 1382.
57 For a comprehensive treatment of economic lockout, see Duvin, supra note 49, at
142; Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 70, 73-77 (1956).
58 Local 374, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59 380 U.S. at 318.
GO See, e.g., Jordan Bus Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 717 (1954); West Fork Cut Glass Co.,
90 N.L.R.B. 944 (1950).
Gl See, e.g., Cox, supra note 21 ; Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain fa Good Faith,
16 Sw. L.J. 43 (1962) ; Sigal, supra note 21; Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to
Bargafo" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065 (1941).
62 Actually discussion of the two requirements cannot be completely separated. Several
of the factors relevant to deadlock are also relevant to the question of good faith.
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A. Number and Ditratio:n of Bargaining Sessions
Every collective bargaining situation is unique. In some instances the
respective positions are clear, and it becomes obvious after only a few meetings
that further negotiations would be futile. In other instances there may be a
number of fruitful bargaining sessions before a deadlock is finally reached.
Therefore, it has never been held that a fixed number of bargaining conferences without agreement will automatically result in impasse. No magic number exists. The number of meetings, however, is a factor often mentioned in
determining an impasse. In some instances, the decision states the number of
bargaining conferences held ;63 in others, there are references to the "frequent
meetings," 64 "numerous conferences," 65 or "series of meetings." 66 One should
not place too much reliance on the number of bargaining sessions since this has
never been the sole factor considered by the Board in determining the existence
of an impasse. 67 Thus, while in some cases the parties met on numerous occasions with the Board finding no impasse,68 in others, an impasse was found
even though there were only a few bargaining sessions.69
Closely related to the number of bargaining sessions is the duration of
negotiations. The parties are not required to continue negotiations indefinitely.70
Once again, there is no magic number, no specific minimum requirement.
Various periods, ranging from one and a half months71 to fourteen months,72
have been found sufficient. The Supreme Court indicated that the duration of
negotiations will not be a controlling factor in determining whether an impasse
has been reached.73
63 Fetzer Television v. NLRB, 317 F2d 420 (6th Cir. 1963) (eight meetings);
NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961) (eight meetings);
U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1951), enforced, 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953) (sixteen meetings) ; Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664
(1951) (twenty-four meetings).
·
64 Exposition Cotton Mills Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1948).
65 American Laundry Mach. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 981 (1948), enforced, 174 F.2d 124
(6th Cir. 1949).
66 Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1948).
67 See Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. RE.v. 666, 674 (1962).
68 See Tex-Tan, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 253 (1961), enforcement denied in part, 318
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963) (twenty-one meetings); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B.
850 (1951), enforcement granted, 205 F2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
( 1953) (thirteen meetings). Although the opinions were not entirely clear, in both cases
the Board seemed to rely on bad faith bargaining on the part of the employer in finding
that there was no impasse.
69 See, e.g., Dalton Brick & Tile Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 473 (1960), enforcement denied
on other grounds, 301 F2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962) (two meetings); Wells Dairies Co-op.,
111 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1955) (three meetings).
10 "[T]he Act does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions
at the expense of frank statement and support of positions.'' NLRB v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
11 Lengel-Fencil, 8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938).
12 Boeing Airplane Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 447 (1948).
73 NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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B. Changes in Bargaining Positions
Although the number and duration of bargaining sessions give some indication of the state of the negotiations, they do not afford conclusive proof of
a deadlock. It is possible for an employer and a union to meet on numerous
occasions for many months without deadlocking. There is another factor that
better indicates whether the parties have deadlocked. The Board and the courts
should direct their attention to the period of time the positions of both the
parties have remained substantially unchanged. If both the employer and the
union have consistently i:efused to alter materially their positions, then it would
seem that the parties have deadlocked.
In almost every Board decision in which the existence of an impasse is
at issue, the trial examiner's report contains a section entitled "negotiations."
A careful reading of this section usually indicates that the trial examiner has
considered the number of collective bargaining sessions that have transpired
since a party significantly altered its position. Often, however, the Board seems
concerned only with changes in the bargaining positions at the last meeting.
If at this meeting both parties express an unwillingness to alter positions, the
Board finds an impasse. Thus, the trial examiner's Intermediate Report and
Recommended Order in American Ship Bldg. indicates that, at the twdfth
and final meeting, the parties submitted and rejected various proposals and
counterproposals. Neither party was willing to deviate from its stand. This
was stressed by the trial examiner in finding an impasse.74
While it is quite probable that the parties were in fact deadlocked in
American Ship Bldg., the Board should consider more than just the last meeting. It should carefully examine the bargaining positions of both parties at the
last few meetings preceding the breakdown in negotiations. If there has been
no substantial change in the position of either party during that period, a finding that the parties have deadlocked seems warranted. Undoubtedly the Board
is already utilizing this method, but its opinions fail to make this clear. In
American Ship Bldg., for example, the number of bargaining sessions is mentioned on several occasions, yet there is no mention of the number of meetings
before the cessation of negotiations in which neither party materially altered its
position. The Board's reticence in this regard is dangerous, since a practitioner
who is not extremely careful may be misled concerning which factors the Board
deems most important.75
142 N.L.R.B. at 1373. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
See Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Actio11-An U11fair Practice!, 9
L. REV. 487, 501 (1956).
H

75

VAND.
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C. Desire to Continue Negotiations
The desire of one party to continue negotiations is commonly cited as the
reason. that a particular collective bargaining situation has not reached an
impasse. An examination of the cases reveals that the Board has been reluctant
to find that an impasse existed unless the attitudes of the negotiators had
hardened to the extent that further talks would have been unavailing. Thus if
either side indicates a willingness to alter its positions, an impasse has not
developed.
In C. C. Lang & Son, Inc., 76 the union receded from its demands for a
wage increase and suggested that the employer draw up a contract embodying
the tentative agreements that had been reached. The employer refused not only
to draw up a contract but also to hold further meetings on the ground that an
impasse had been reached. The Board was not persuaded by his impasse argument and held that the employer, by refusing to bargain, had violated section 8(a) (5).
In C. C. Lang & Son, further good faith negotiations probably would have
been fruitful. The union was willing not only to continue bargaining but also
to alter its bargaining position. Here, there is no reason why the negotiations
should be halted. A case in which the union expresses a willingness to continue
negotiations but does not offer to change its bargaining position presents a
much harder problem, since the success of further negotiations is more uncertain. In this situation, the motives and interests of both parties must be considered in deciding whether the employer and the union should be required to
continue negotiations.
The union should not be allowed to use either prolonged negotiations,
which are time consuming and expensive, as a tool of harassment, or its willingness to continue bargaining as a means for controlling the timing of a work
stoppage. The Court in American Ship Bldg. recognized that the right to strike
does not include the exclusive right to determine when work stoppages should
occur.77 Yet, if there could be no impasse as long as the union wished to continue negotiations, this would be the practical result, since under the American
Ship Bldg. holding the employer could not lock out until an impasse in bargaining had been reached.78 On the other hand, the Board must attach some
importance to the union's desire to continue negotiations. The national labor
policy favoring the settlement of disputes by collective bargaining demands this,
76102 N.L.RB. 1667 (1953), enforced, 212 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1954).
77 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965).
78 It is important to remember that the absence of an impasse does not affect the
union's power to strike. Thus even if there is no impasse, the union can strike to improve
its bargaining position, but the employer cannot lock out.
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for if the union is willing to change its position, perhaps the conflicts can be
settled and an impasse avoided.

D. Mediator
A fourth factor that has been mentioned in many "impasse" cases is the
presence of a mediator at one or more of the bargaining sessions. Several
inferences have been drawn from the utilization of a third party.79 The mere
calling in of a mediator indicated to the Board that the bargaining had reached
an impasse.80 The Sixth Circuit, in NLRB v. Cambria· Clay Prods. Co.,81
placed less emphasis on the presence of a federal mediator alone. Instead,
relying on a provision of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Act, which
makes it the duty of the service to use its best efforts to bring the parties to an
agreement, 82 the court held that since the mediator did not arrange any further
meetings there were no prospects of reaching an agreement.
Most cases do not expressly attach either of the above interpretations to
the utilization of a neutral third party, but merely mention his presence.83
This makes it difficult to ascertain the significance of this factor in determining
whether a deadlock in the collective bargaining has been reached. Obviously,
there is not a deadlock in every case in which a mediator appears. The large
number of cases in which the parties have called in mediators and yet the
courts found no impasse clearly bears this out.at
While the presence of a mediator should not be considered as a condition
precedent to an impasse,85 it should be a significant factor in determining
whether the negotiations have deadlocked. Because of traditional political
distrust of governmental intervention,86 unwillingness to give up what is felt
to be superior bargaining power, and fear that mediators are prejudiced in
79 See, e.g., Utah County Tractor Sales, 103 N.L.R.B. 1711 (1953) ; Anchor Rome
Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1949).
SO Mission Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 275, 287 (1960).
s1215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954).
s2 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(b) (1964).
as See, e.g., American Ship Bldg., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1962) ; W. W. Cross & Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948).
84 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) ; NLRB v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp.,
270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Body & Tanic Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1414 (1963),
enforced, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964). In these cases, however, the finding of no impasse
seemed based on the lack of good· faith by the employer, rather than the absence of a
deadlock.
85 Such a rule would be neither popular nor practical. The cost of making government mediation a prerequisite for finding an impasse would be exorbitant. Active mediation
is now required in only 7% of all contracts negotiated. See Simkin, The Third Seat al
the Bargaining Table-A Government Point of View, 14 LAB. L.J. 5 (1963).
86 See Douglas, What Can Research Tell Us About Mediation!, 6 LAB. L.J. 545, 549
(1955). Dr. Douglas's study is especially interesting since she examines the psychological
basis of the distrust of mediators.
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favor of the other side,s7 both the employer and the union are hesitant to allow
a third party to take part in collective bargaining negotiations.ss Thus a
mediator is rarely called in unless the parties feel that the negotiations are at a
deadlock.S 9 If the mediator is unable to bring about a settlement, then, in most
cases, the Board should find that a deadlock exists.90
III. NECESSITY To DEADLOCK oN ALL IssuEs
In most cases, the employer and the union are bargaining collectively on
more than one issue.91 Often the parties will bargain on one issue at a time
and will not consider a new issue until they have resolved the prior one. Thus,
in Pool Mfg. Co.,92 the parties were deadlocked on the issue of wages but not
on the issue of union security. The union wished to bargain on twelve separate
i;nandatory subjects of bargaining. From the first session on, the parties were
deadlocked on the initial matter discussed, wages. The union suggested that
they bargain on one of the other problem areas, but the employer refused,
stating that there was no need to discuss the terms of a contract until an
agreement had been reached on wages. The Board found that a deadlock had
been reached as to wages, but that this deadlock did not constitute a defense
to a refusal to bargain over the other matters that the union requested be
considered.
Pool Mfg. Co. does not conclusively settle the question of whether all
issues must be deadlocked before an impasse exists. There are limiting factors
indicating that the application of the holding in Pool should be restricted to the
fact situation involved in the case : ( 1) the parties never considered some of
the mandatory bargaining issues proposed for discussion, and (2) the employer
refused to bargain on mandatory subjects other than wages even before an
impasse was reached regarding wages. Therefore, Pool should not be determinative of cases where all mandatory subjects are discussed before the parties
deadlock on one subject.
Although there is no express language on this point, a number of holdings
indicate that a deadlock on all issues is not necessary to a finding of impasse.93
S7

Strangely enough this feeling is held by both employers and the union. See Fallon,

Trends In the Use of Mediation in Private Industry, 9 LAB. L.J. 753 (1958).
S8 See Ibid. Macraz, General Role of Mediation in Collective Bargaining, 11 LAB. L.J.
453, 454 (1960); Murphy, Curreat Trends in Labor Arbitration, N.Y.U. llTH ANNUAL
CoNF. ON LABOR 231, 235 (1958).
89 See Turnbull & Kanun, Conciliation and Mediation in Minnesota, 3 LAB. L.J. 677,
681 (1952).

00 Mediation would be no guarantee of an impasse. The question of good faith would
still remain.
91 See CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCEDURES 77 (1944).
02 70 N.L.R.B. 540 (1946).
93 See, e.g., Jordan Bus Co., 107 ~.L.R.B. 717 (1954); Kentucky-Tennessee Oay
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 252 (1943); Essex Wire Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 51 (1940).
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Sharon Hats Inc. 94 is a good example. There the parties bargained primarily
about wages, but also discussed other matters such as vacations, checkoff, and
a no-strike clause. After bargaining for over two months without reaching an
agreement, the parties decided to discontinue negotiations. Although the only
issue deadlocked was wages, the Board found that an impasse in bargaining
had been reached.
There are cases where, although the parties are deadlocked on one issue,
the Board has recognized a duty to bargain on the other issues. Some are
similar to Pool where mandatory subjects of bargaining were not even discussed.95 In others, the parties had bargained about all mandatory subjects,
but had bargained in good faith only on the deadlocked issue.96 Thus if the
parties in good faith consider all mandatory subjects of bargaining before a
deadlock on one subject is reached, it would seem that an impasse exists.
Policy considerations both support and oppose the present law. Allowing
the parties to end negotiations after they have become deadlocked on less than
all of the issues takes into account situations where both the employer and the
union are concerned with only one main issue. Until this issue is resolved, no
progress can be made on the less important differences. The present law is also
consistent with the position of those who view collective bargaining as a meaningless ritual. 97 Their theory is that, for all practical purposes, the parties agree
on the major issues before negotiations even start, and collective bargaining
is merely a "process by which the main terms of the agreement ... are made
acceptable ... to those who will have to live with its results." 98 If this view
is correct, compelling the parties to bargain to an impasse on all issues is not
realistic. 99
It is submitted that stronger policy considerations support a contrary
position. Even in cases where a particular matter is of primary importance to
the parties, resolution of this issue generally will not result in complete accord
between the parties since there will usually be other subjects to be considered.
The parties will have to bargain over these matters eventually so it is not
94127 N.L.R.B. 947 (1960), enforced, 289 F2d 628 (5th Cir. 1961).
95 See Barrett Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 1327 (1942), enforced, 135 F2d 959 (7th Cir. 1943);
Louisville Rei Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844 (1938), modified and enforced, 102 F2d 678 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939).
96 See NLRB v. H.G. Hill Stores, 140 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1944); Metal Hose &
Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1940). In Metal Hose & Tubing, the collective bargaining
centered on wages and union security. Although the Board found that the parties had
deadlocked on the union security question, it held that the negotiations were not at an
impasse. The Board looked to the parties' bargaining method rather than the necessity
of deadlocking on all issues. The employer had rejected union wage demands in toto
and had refused to make any proposals, indicating to the Board his lack of good faith.
97 See Blum, Collective Bargaining: Ritual or Reality?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1961, p. 63; Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 666, 691 (1962).
98 Blum, supra note 97, at 64-65.
99 If this view is correct, perhaps the entire concept of impasse is unrealistic.
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unreasonable to require them to do so before finding an impasse. Further, even
if agreement on the primary issue would effectuate accord concerning other
matters, complete bargaining on them might have avoided the deadlock on the
primary issue; either the employer or the union might have retreated from its
inflexible position because of concessions during the negotiations _on other items.

IV.

CONCLUSION

American Ship Bldg. has greatly increas.ed the scope of the impasse
concept, yet the practical significance of impasse is limited by the difficulty of
ascertaining when the concept is applicable. The problem is not that the Board
is considering improper factors in determining whether the parties have deadlocked, rather, it is the difficulty-if not the impossibility-of ascertaining what
factors the Board is considering.100 Although it would be neither practical nor
advisable for the Board to promulgate a series of inflexible rules concerning
impasse, the Board should at least enunciate general gnidelines on which the
parties may rely.
100 One commentator has suggested that vagueness in this area is a virtue, not a vice:
"To prevent unions and management from directing their bargaining toward Washington
rather than toward each other, the procedures to be followed should be kept vague so
that both sides will be kept guessing." Blum, supra note 97, at 69.

